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Introduction 
 As the Patriarchate's newspaper observed in 1990, "Brotherhoods appear at critical 
moments in the life of the Church and society."1The brotherhoods movement in Russia gained 
particular strength in two critical periods; during the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, as 
"bearers of the official politics of the Great Moscow Princedom"2, and in the 1860's –1920's, 
when they were revived to struggle with heresy and sectarianism,3and then with the new currents 
of revolutionary thought. The revival of the Brotherhood movement that occurred in the 1980's 
and early 1990's reflected a complex response of Russian believers, both lay and clerical, to the 
newfound freedoms of the so-called glasnost and 'transition' periods. Lay believers, mostly 
moved by a desire to restore the material and spiritual fabric of Orthodox life after decades of 
repression and official atheism, recreated or initiated brotherhoods around individual clerics or 
projects, such as the restoration of a local church or the establishment of a Sunday School. The 
creation of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods in 1990, instigated by the Patriarchate to co-
ordinate the activities of flourishing lay organisations, marked in some ways the spiritual peak of 
the movement. Despite a promising beginning, the movement has been plagued by the 
xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance and political conservatism visible in many areas of the 
                                                 
1 Moskovskii tserkovnyi vestnik No. 23 (41) October 1990. 
 
2 Archpriest Ioann Sviridov "Est' li mesto bratstva, v sovremennoi zhizni Russkoi Tserkvi?" 
Russkaia mysl' No.4061 19-25 January 1995 p.16. 
 
3 Polnyi pravoslavnyi bogoslovskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Moscow 1992)  Vol.1, col.407. 
 
Russian Orthodox Church, and the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods has arguably become a 
symbol of the worst aspects of post-Communist Orthodoxy.4
 Various commentators have attempted to find a label that will appropriately cover these 
negative traits prevalent within the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church. Collectively, they 
have been described as 'Black Hundredism',5'clerical fascism'6and 'Russian Orthodox 
fascism',7terms that have very specific resonances and are not broad enough to cover the 
spectrum of ideas indicated. Recently,  'fundamentalist' - a term that has attracted a good deal of 
criticism and debate, although not in the Russian Orthodox context – has become a popular label 
for this wing of the Church.8 This article aims to explore the fundamentalist tendencies of the 
movement, focusing on two brotherhoods often identified as belonging to opposite ends of the 




 The term 'fundamentalism' was coined in 1920 by the American editor of a Baptist 
journal, to describe the evangelical desire to return to Biblical 'fundamentals'.9It is now popularly 
                                                 
4 See for example Dimitry V. Pospielovsky "The Russian Orthodox Church in the 
Postcommunist CIS" in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia edited 
by Michael Bourdeaux (M.E.Sharpe, New York & London 1995 p.52 
5 Wayne Allensworth The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization and Post-Communist 
Russia (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.; Oxford 1998) p.130 
 
6 Thomas Parland "The Rejection in Russia of Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal Democracy: A 
study of the Russian New Right" Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium 46, 1993 p.187 
 
7 Paul D. Steeves, "Russian Orthodox Fascism" a paper presented to the Conference on Faith 
and History, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 8 October 1994 available online at 
http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/rusorthfascism.html   
 
8 See for example Stephen Shenfield's Russian Fascism:Traditions, Tendencies, Movements 
(M.E.Sharpe, New York, London 2001) pp.61-72 and Alexander Verkhovsky's "September 11 
and the Orthodox Anti-Globalism of the Moscow Patriarchate" in JRL Research and Analytical 
Supplement Issue No. 3 (Special issue on themes relating to September 11 December 2001), 
available online at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5592.cfm (accessed 15/04/02) 
 
9 Martin Riesebrot Pious Passion: The Emergence of Fundamentalism in the United States and 
Iran (University of California Press; Berkley & London 1998) p.10 
used to describe the 'militant piety'10 which rejects the values of the modern Western world and - 
in some cases - promotes armed struggle against this world. The six-year Fundamentalism 
Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences acknowledges the limitations of the term, 
but offers a working definition of fundamentalism as: 
...a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities...which 
manifests itself as a strategy, or a set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers 
attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a group. Feeling this identity to be 
at risk in the contemporary era, they fortify it by selective retrieval of doctrines, 
beliefs, and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved "fundamentals" are 
refined, modified, and sanctioned in a spirit of shrewd pragmatism...[and] 
accompanied in the new religious portfolio by unprecedented claims and doctrinal 
innovations.11
 
The Fundamentalism Project also concludes that:  
...fundamentalism intends neither an artificial imposition of archaic practices and 
lifestyles, not a simple return to a golden era, a sacred past, a bygone time of 
origins – although nostalgia for such an era is a hallmark of fundamentalist 
rhetoric. Instead, religious identity thus renewed becomes the exclusive and 
absolute basis for a re-created political and social order that is orientated to the 
future rather than the past.12
 
Furthermore, the directors of the project identify in fundamentalist movements 'a dual 
commitment to the unfolding eschatological drama (by returning all things in submission to the 
divine) and to self-preservation (by neutralizing the threatening "Other").13 The project, in the 
conclusion to its final volume Fundamentalisms Comprehended, identified nine ideological and 
organisational characteristics of fundamentalism. Due to limitations of time and space I have 
selected three key traits based on their working definition of fundamentalism, and in this article 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10 Karen Armstrong The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
(HarperCollins, London 2001) p.ix 
 
11 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking 
Politics, Economies, and Militance (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1993) p.3 
 
12Marty and Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and the State p.3 
 
13 Marty and Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and the State p.3 
 
explore the extent to which they are in evidence in the ideology and strategies of the 
brotherhoods selected: 
 
1) A sense of religious identity under threat, from the modern world and the enemy 'Other' 
2) A nostalgia for a sacred past, and a desire or strategy to construct a future society based on 
religious identity  
3) A selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices from this sacred past, which are 
pragmatically refined, modified, and supplemented by innovations 
 
The Union of Orthodox Banner-bearers  
 The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers (Soiuz pravoslavnykh khorugvenosstev) 14 was 
co-founded in 1993 by Leonid Simonovich, who is also the current head of the Union of 
Orthodox Brotherhoods. Simonovich describes the Banner-Bearers as a 'charismatic' and 
'military movement', and based on a pre-revolutionary organisation, the Society of Banner-
Bearers.15While this organisation certainly existed, and bore some resemblance to the current 
Union in terms of activities, the rules of the Banner-Bearers appear on their website under the 
name 'the Union of the Russian People, infamous as the largest and best organised Black 
Hundreds group.16 The contemporary Union of Banner-Bearers follows the Black Hundreds 
precedent17of denying membership even to converted Jews. It is also hardly coincidence that the 
pre-revolutionary Union of the Russian People called for the formation of counter-revolutionary 
military units,18and Simonovich's Union profess to be training a military unit who can be 
                                                 
14 An unregistered organisation which identifies itself as a brotherhood 
 
15 Leonid Simonovich (Interview, Moscow, May 13 2001) 
 
16 http://www.rus-sky.com/horugvenosec/oprichnina/ustav.htm (last accessed June 10, 2001) 
 
17 Wayne Allensworth The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization and Post-Communist 
Russia p.129 
 
18 Wayne Allensworth The Russian Question  p.129 
 
mobilised "at any moment", and to have at their disposal Siberian, Zaporozhian, Don, Kuban and 
Ural Cossacks. 19
 Shenfield observes that "the main division [in the ROC] is between a liberal or 
modernizing wing that draws inspiration from the philosopher-theologians of the Silver Age, and 
a fundamentalist or reactionary wing that looks back to a golden age of true Orthodoxy under the 
Tsars".20 While Simonovich's Banner-Bearers are consciously modelling themselves on an 
organisation that belongs to this particular mythical 'golden age' of Russian Orthodoxy, they are 
pragmatic about which elements they carry into the modern world. Their website proudly shows 
a contemporary Banner-Bearer standing next to his pre-revolutionary counterpart, who wears a 
long, ornate kaftan. The contemporary uniforms of the Union are black and military in style, 
more suited to the battleground of the modern world. 
 For Simonovich and the members of his Union, we are living in the Last Days, and 
politics is an irrelevance. The battle-lines are religious: 
...in the contemporary world, politics... does not play any role. Nowadays, religion 
and the national idea have begun to play a role; this is happening everywhere, 
literally around the whole world, and wars, when they occur, have a religious 
character. The Chechen war is a purely religious war. No one talks about it of 
course, it's not nice [to]. It is a war between Orthodox and Muslim, without any 
doubt. And the same thing is happening in Serbia, in Kosovo...21
America is castigated as a secular Satan, whose crime in bombing the Serbs is not her 
interference in the affairs of another state, but her decision to take up arms against an Orthodox 
country: 
The Holy War that John the Evangelist spoke of is upon us, and will leave none of 
us untouched. "There is no greater love, and nothing more pleasing in the eyes of 
God, than to lay down one's life for one's brother", teach the Apostles. Our 
Serbian brothers have drawn upon themselves the fire of the Satanists, and are 
                                                 
19 Leonid Simonovich (Interview, Moscow, May 13 2001) 
 
20 Stephen Shenfield Russian Fascism:Traditions, Tendencies, Movements (M.E.Sharpe, New 
York, London 2001) p.64 
 
21 Leonid Simonovich (Interview, May 13 2001) 
 
showing the world that holy Apostolic love, by sacrificing their lives for us. How 
can we remain deaf to their suffering? We must give all of our strength and 
abilities, however small they may be, like the widow's tithe in the Gospels, to the 
suffering people of Yugoslavia. "Russia's mission, given to her from on high, is to 
block the way of worldwide Satanism and hold out to the end, until God's 
proclamation of victory over Satan. Amen."22
The Union's primary aim is to 'resurrect the spirit' of Russian Orthodoxy, by conducting 
processions with banners and icons (khrestnye khody) in Moscow and the regions. They appear 
to have some measure of success in their missionary aims – a procession organised by the Union 
in July 1999, which covered around 1000 km in the Moscow, Tver and Tula regions, allegedly 
began with between 30-35,000 participants in Moscow.23Patriotic organisations from Nizhnii 
Novgorod, Sergeiev Posad and Tver joined their Moscow brethren to march along the Kremlin 
embankment, and were filmed by around 20 television companies. Fundamentalist organisations 
could not account for such a large crowd, and popular support for the canonisation of the Tsar's 
family played a significant role. More recently, over 3000 people joined the Banner-Bearers to 
commemorate the 85th anniversary of the Tsar's abdication on March 16, 2002, where 
Simonovich called for "a struggle against the genocide of the Russian people".24 The numbers 
present at these events indicate the success of the organisation in manipulating modern 
communications and achieving mass mobilization, and that they have some appeal to those 
outside their membership. 
 Like other fundamentalist religious groups, the Union retrieve a somewhat eclectic mix 
of sacred fundamentals from the past. Divine order, and respect for hierarchy support their 
monarchist ideology: 
...if you go against the Patriarch you transgress the principle of hierarchy itself, 
violate a sacred principle. Its the same with the monarchy – it is forbidden to go 
against the Tsar, against the Emperor...Who is it that goes against the Emperor, 
                                                 
22 A public speech by Simonovich, reported in "The Faithful vs. TV" Sovetskaya Rossia, 
20/04/1999 
 
23 "Os' vremen" in Russkii vestnik, No.40-41, 1999 
 
24 UCSJ news http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/032202Russ3.shtml  
 
Tsar or King? Revolutionaries, traitors, Satanists, in our understanding, 
[according to] the Church.25
Adhering to this fundamental does not prevent them opposing the Patriarch however. During the 
course of our interview Simonovich mentioned several circumstances in which they had to 'go 
against' him; when he declared that individual tax numbers (the notorious INN) were safe for 
believers to accept,26when he addressed the American Rabbis in a spirit of brotherly love in 
November 1991, when he condemned an attack on a Moscow synagogue as an attack on a House 
of God. At this point Simonovich resurrected a more important fundamental – the Patristic 
declaration that a synagogue is a refuge of demons.27Simonovich's organisation also seeks to 
resurrect the medieval myth of Jewish ritual murder as evidence of the Jewish threat, publicly 
calling for the canonisation of Andriushy Iushchinsky, whom Jews were accused of murdering in 
1911, and declaring that the murder of Tsar Paul I bore the hallmarks of a 'Masonic' ritual 
killing.28
 Simonovich and his organisation also reveal as characteristic fundamentalist fear that the 
true identity of Russian Orthodoxy is under threat. He perceives true believers in the Church to 
be outnumbered and threatened by what he calls 'the left wing' of the Church, and his articles 
make clear that he equates this left wing with Jewish converts: "it has long ceased to be a secret 
that in our contemporary Church there is, as it were, two parallel churches – the church of 
Hellenes, that is the Russians, and the Church of the Jews..."29 Jews above all are the threatening 
'Other' in Simonovich's ideology, infiltrating the Russian Orthodox Church, constantly engaged 
in a struggle to destroy Holy Russia. The organisation actively campaigns to 'neutralize the 
threat': 
                                                 
25 Leonid Simonovich (Interview, Moscow May 13, 2001) 
 
26 See Alexander Verkhovsky's "Radical Orthodox Anti-Globalism in 1999-2002: Electronic 
Tax Codes – A Topical Theme for Fundamentalists", a paper given at the University of Sussex 
April 2002, for a full discussion of the campaign against INN. 
 
27 Leonid Simonovich (Interview, Moscow May 13, 2001) 
 
28 Blagovest-Info/Sobornost, 28 March 2001 
 
29 http://www.rus-sky.com/horugvenosec/Simonovichichich/heresy.htm (last accessed April 
2001); my translation. 
 
...The prophet monk Avel said, that on Rus there were [imposed] two yokes – the 
Tartar-Mongol and the Polish-Lithuanian, and there will be one more – the most 
terrible – the JEWISH. And we, brothers and sisters, are suffering it now with 
you. But one should never remain indifferent, one must never sleep, never simply 
pray – one must fight, brothers and sisters, we need to fight for the freeing of our 
homeland from the Jewish yoke!30
 
 Further threats to the integrity of Russian Orthodoxy are offered by Roman Catholics, 
NATO and the West, and the Union have been active in organising and participating in many 
political demonstrations against these enemies. The Union exhibit the characteristic 
fundamentalist tendency to "seize upon opportunities provided by the process of secular 
modernization...[such as] the means of communication and recruitment".31They maintain a large 
and distinctive website, which gives visitors instructions about events to attend, such as the 2001 
march against the Pope's proposed visit to Ukraine organised by the Union of Orthodox Citizens, 
and the Victory Day marches where they mingle with Communists and in 2001 carried a banner 
declaring "Freedom for Colonel Budanov", the Russian officer accused of raping and murdering 
an 18 year old Chechen girl. More recently, Simonovich and Vladimir Osipov of the Union of 
Christian Rebirth headed a march to celebrate the birthday of the Mother of God and the victory 
over the Tartars on Kulikovo field, at which Simonovich declared that the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 were "the revenge of the Lord Jesus Christ for the bombardment of 
Orthodox Serbia".32
 Simonovich's organisation fits the model of "militant piety" well – he describes the faith 
of his foot-soldiers as ''aggressive", and perceives the need for an active rather than 
contemplative faith in a world of religious conflict: 
                                                 
30 http://www.rus-sky.com/horugvenosec/Simonovich/heresy.htm (last accessed April 2001). 
Simonovich used the offensive adjective ‘zhidovskii’ from ‘zhid’ - yid or kike. 
 
31 Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, R. Scott Appleby "Fundamentalism: Genus and 
Species" in Fundamentalisms Comprehended ed. Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby 
(University of Chicago Press; Chicago and London 1995) p.405 
 
32 Blagovest-Info news report 21.09.01 . 
 
Now above all is a time for practical work, it is not a time for theory, now is not a 
time for theology, but for witness...Theology is when you sit and write, but 
witness is when, like yesterday,33you go out against, or for...34
 
Radonezh 
 If the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers key strategy is to carry Orthodoxy out onto the 
street, Radonezh's strategy has been to bring Orthodoxy into people's homes. This brotherhood is 
part of perhaps the largest Orthodox social organisation, incorporating an effective mini media 
empire - a radio channel, newspaper, video production unit and website. Also one of the oldest 
religious lay organisations, Radonezh was formed in 1988 by Vyacheslav Rodionov, a former 
political prisoner and co-editor with Vladimir Osipov of the samizdat journal Zemlia. It falls 
firmly within the group of fundamentalists who consider themselves patriotic, conservative and 
monarchist, but do not propagate an aggressive nationalism or overt antisemitism. They stress 
their non-political character, and portray themselves as moderates who are primarily concerned 
with the restoration of the material and spiritual fabric of Russian Orthodoxy. This has not 
always been the case – Radonezh have worked hard to improve their tarnished image since the 
mid-1990's. Today there is evidence of conflict between Radonezh and their former radical 
associates. According to Leonid Simonovich, Radonezh will no longer advertise the rallies and 
marches planned by the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers on their radio station, because – he 
asserts – their actions are too radical for Radonezh to stomach, and because Radonezh are too 
commercialised.35
 The Radonezh brotherhood has a school, a fund to restore Church bells (the work of 
which has been blessed by the Patriarch), they organise exhibitions and restore Churches. The 
brotherhood consider themselves an 'open structure', and membership of the brotherhood is very 
fluid, with brothers gathering for particular activities but not 'kissing the cross' or taking any 
formal steps to join. Rodionov's wife, Elena Nomakova, counted around fifty employees of 
Radonezh who are members of the brotherhood, and guessed at a total membership of about one 
                                                 
33 Simonovich is referring to a march against the Pope's proposed visit to Ukraine 
 
34 Leonid Simonovich, (Interview, May 13, 2001) 
 
35 Blagovest-Info 26.03.01 
 
hundred.36 They have affiliated brotherhoods in St Petersburg and other towns. Like several 
other brotherhoods, Radonezh have supporters in America, in this case, influential individuals in 
Washington. The wider organisation has a number of ventures including an independent finance 
company, also called Radonezh, a Christian medical centre and an Orthodox pharmacy. 
 Radonezh was one of the original members of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, and 
is still technically a member although they are far less active within the Union today. Elena 
Nomakova, who despite her gender is clearly active in the management of the organisation 
(which indicates the moderate nature of their fundamentalism), explained that they don't have 
time to participate in the weekly or twice weekly meetings of the Union. She was not overtly 
critical of the Union, but observed that "it's a madhouse, there are some very good people there, 
clever, Orthodox, normal, [and] there are simply not normal [people], who simply shout."37 On 
the question of radical or extremist brotherhoods, such as the Union of Banner-Bearers, they 
observed that this is pluralism, and everyone has the right to their own opinion. Similarly, despite 
an overtly anti-ecumenical stance, they did not participate in demonstrations against the Pope's 
visit to the Ukraine, observing that Ukraine is a separate State and had the right to invite the 
Pope if they so wished. 
 Nevertheless, Radonezh share the fundamentalist tendency to identify enemies who 
threaten the true Russian Orthodox identity. Evgenii Nikiforov, the editor of Radonezh, has 
called Polish citizens of Russia and Byelorussia "the fifth Catholic column".38 Curiously, these 
enemies are as often fellow Orthodox as alien 'Other' - either internal 'heretics' such as Fr 
Kotchetkov, who has attracted significant hostility for his celebration of the liturgy in modern 
Russian, or foreign Orthodox: 
The ecclesiastical dispute between Moscow and Constantinople in the beginning 
of 1996 was nothing more than a quarrel between two sisters, as N. A. Struve 
correctly pointed out. And as he suggested, this would not have been too 
significant except for the reaction fomented by the communo-patriotic types of 
                                                 
36 Elena Nomakova, Radonezh (Interview, Moscow, May 30 2001) 
  
37 Elena Nomakova, Radonezh (Interview, Moscow, May 30 2001)  
 
38 Maxim Shevchenko 'Starye metody, novoi epokhi' NG religii No.14 (85) 25/07/01 
 
media. Sovietskaya Rossiia, Zavtra, Russkii vestnik, as well as (which is 
especially sad) the Orthodox paper Radonezh with the similarly named youth 
organization, literally fell all over themselves rushing to prove that the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate fell away from Orthodoxy some time ago, that Vladyka 
Bartholomew for some time has not been the Constantinopolian but a Turkish 
patriarch, that neither he nor his patriarchate has any influence in the Orthodox 
world, etc.39
Maxim Shevchenko points out that over the years, Radonezh have campaigned against 
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad - guilty of betraying the interests of Orthodoxy; 
against Metropolitans Filaret of Minsk and Valdimir of St Petersburg – guilty of ecumenism; 
Hegumens Ioann Ekonomtsev and Ilarion Alfayeev - guilty of heresy; and the priests Frs. 
Aleksandr Borisov and Georgii Chistiakov - guilty of 'Renovationism'.40The relationship 
between Radonezh and the Moscow Patriarchate has – unsurprisingly - not been a smooth one, 
although Rodionov stressed in interview that the Church is a unity, and therefore there cannot be 
any other kind of relationship other than one sanctioned by the Church. The Patriarch was 
troubled enough by their propaganda to announce publicly that Radonezh does not express the 
position of the Church, and in 1997 and again in 1998, withdrew his blessing from the newspaper 
Radonezh.41 The brotherhood leadership were however quick to declare that their strength lies in 
their independence: 
In this is our strength, that we have the right [to criticise]... not one priest of the 
Patriarchate, nor one Bishop has the right to criticise the actions of the 
Patriarchate, and this is correct - strict subordination, obedience...but we are an 
independent organisation, and we can criticise that which then, incidentally, as a 
result of our criticism, the Patriarchate changes...like we struggled for ten years 
for the canonisation of the Tsar's family. The Patriarchate was of a different 
opinion, which as you know, changed.42
                                                 
39 Fr Georgii Chistiakov 'Whence this Anger?', published in Russkaia mysl'  (Paris) October 10, 
1996; available online at http://www.agape-biblia.org/prpakety/agapreab/Whencang.htm  
 
40 Maxim Shevchenko, 'Starye metody, novoi epokhi' in NG Religii, No.14 (85), 25/07/01 
 
41 Alexander Verkhovsky 'Tserkov' v politike i politika v tserkvi' in Politicheskaia ksenophobiia 
( Panorama, Moscow 1999) p. 94, 99 
 
42 Elena Nomakova, Radonezh (Interview, Moscow, May 30 2001) 
 
 Radonezh are no doubt correct in their assessment of their influence. Their successful 
manipulation of modern media has to some extent won them the propaganda war at parish-level, 
and the hierarchy are wary of challenging their ideology outright. Those who do challenge 
Radonezh, such as Maxim Shevchenko, former editor of Nezavisimaya gazeta religii,43the 
religious news agency Blagovest-Info,44 and the Sretenie Brotherhood of Father Georgii 
Kotchetkov, may on occassion win the intellectual argument or seize the moral high ground, but 
they are not reaching the grassroots to the same extent. In 1996 Hegumen Innokentii Pavlov 
complained that  
our home-grown 'orthodox fundamentalists'...have their own active-enough 
strength...As a practicing parish priest I have more than once been talking to 
people who are not long coming to the Church but are already showing signs of 
spiritual zombification from the radio programmes of Radonezh, which, 
evidently, many regard as an official Church radio channel. It becomes painful 
when a still-young person or a lady of pensionable age begins in conversation 
with you to dream about 'orthodox monarchy', to see in all the troubles of Russia 




 Based on the working definition of the Fundamentalism Project, it seems legitimate to 
use the term 'fundamentalist' in the Russian context to indicate groups who aggressively reject 
most of the modern, secular values introduced during the Soviet and post-Soviet period, who 
desire to return to a past that is perceived as holier than the besmirched present, and to selected 
principles of that past as evidenced by 'holy tradition'. As Father Sergei Hackel has pointed out,46 
                                                 
43 See for example (and there are many!) NG religii 23/02/00 
 
44 See Russkaia mysl' (Paris) 10/02/00 
 
45 Hegumen Innokentii "Vsegda ia rad zametit' raznost'" in Segodnia No.186, 10/10/96 
 
46Presentation on Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism at the University of Sussex, 10/04/02 
 
the fundamentals of Russian Orthodoxy are perceived by this element of the Russian Orthodox 
Church to be embedded not solely in texts, but in rite and ritual too. 
 Nostalgia for a 'sacred past' - often the nineteenth century but in some instances the pre-
Petrine period, the reign of Paul I or that of Ivan the Terrible - and the determination to re-create 
a political and social order based on religious identity, is a key element in the ideology of the 
Brotherhood movement, and of other groups within the Russian Orthodox Church. In Tver in 
March 2000 Valentin Lebedev, Chairman of the Union of Orthodox Citizens47and editor of the 
popular Pravoslavnaia beseda (Orthodox conversation) opened a conference on 'Monarchy in 
Russian Life: The Return to Self' with the statement: "The revival of Russia is impossible 
without a reconstruction of the monarchy; you see only in this case can the country execute the 
mission commanded by God - construction of the Third Rome".48For the fundamentalists, Russia 
is and always was 'holy', a bulwark against the forces of evil (be they the Golden Horde, fascist, 
communist or capitalist) with a special mission for the future. This mission can only be realised 
if she resurrects her religious identity and the essential components or fundamentals of that 
identity; the monarchy, Orthodox family life (marriage between a non-working Orthodox 
wife/mother and an Orthodox husband), the ritual trappings of 'pure' Orthodoxy (a liturgy in 
Church Slavonic, use of the Julian calender, appropriate dress in Church49 for example), Patristic 
antisemitism, a respect for the military and a vigorous patriotism.  
 A sense of beleaguered religious identity, under threat from the modern world and an 
enemy 'Other' is often found in contemporary Russian Orthodox organizations. Father Georgii 
Chistiakov has called the enemy-centred Orthodoxy that he sees as having over-run Russia 
'inimicocentrism' (from the Latin inimicus, enemy). Fr Chistiakov argues that a similar enemy-
centred ideology was prevalent in the Soviet period, but was also a feature of nineteenth century 
Russian Orthodoxy and earlier, and stems from an intrinsically pagan rather than Christ-centered 
                                                 
47 Lebedev's Union is an umberella organisation that incorporates brotherhoods and other 
Orthodox organisations, and unites them in public actions such as demonstrations against the 
Pope etc. 
 
48 Ol'ga Zaitseva 'Za Tsaria, za rodinu, za veru' in Tverskaia zhizn' 04/04/2002 
 
49 Women in headscarves and over-knee skirts, men with bare heads and long sleeves. This, of 
course, is not exclusively a Russian Orthodox 'fundamental'.  
 
world-view.50 Many brotherhoods have a clearly identified "Other" in the Jew; sometimes alone, 
sometimes in tandem with or supplanted by the West, the 'New World Order', America or, 
increasingly, globalization. Eschatological beliefs often form part of this ideology, usually in the 
perception of an immanent or current conflict between the Antichrist (whose role is played by 
'the Other,' be it Jews, America or globalization) and the force for good - the fundamentalist 
believers.  
 The reasons for the growth of fundamentalist tendencies in the Russian Orthodox Church 
cannot be addressed comprehensively in an article of this length, but it is worth mentioning a 
number of factors that have contributed to the flourishing of fundamentalist groups in 
contemporary Russia. The lobbying power of the fundamentalists within the Church is 
significant, and to a large extent this is as a result of their successful exploitation of mass media. 
While loudly rejecting the modern world, many fundamentalist groups have been quick to 
exploit the technological advances in communications, and maintain Internet sites in addition to 
more traditional media. Sergei Chapnin, who was formerly editor of the Internet journal 
Sobornost  - which was created in an attempt to provide an alternative to the large number of 
fundamentalist publications and websites - observes that  
The main problem is that here in Christian media there is no strong official 
publication of the Russian Orthodox Church. All the official publications are so 
weak and absolutely stupid that nobody reads them for the last four of five years. 
And these fundamentalists they caught the situation, and they put the emphasis on 
media, and it worked. The church is under their influence now, and I think the 
Patriarch himself is afraid of these people, of this ideology.51
 The increase in fundamentalism has also been explained by some commentators as a 
result of the huge numbers of parishes opening for which there are not enough educated priests. 
In 1989 Moscow had 47 churches and around 100 priests – in 1999 Moscow had almost 400 
churches, and the Russian Orthodox Church more than 19,000 parishes in all. In order to fill 
parish vacancies standards have been lowered, and young priests with little theological education 
are being given pastoral care of parishioners who are often without any Christian education 
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whatsoever. In these circumstances, priest and parishioners turn to radio Radonezh, to the mass 
of cheap literature produced by active fundamentalists, such as pamphlets advising believers that 
to work as an actress or hairdresser is sinful, and that "wherever there is dancing, [there] the 
devil will be".52 In part this problem has been aggravated by the continual republishing of many 
pre-revolutionary spiritual works, while in many seminaries and parishes the works of modern 
Orthodox thinkers such as John Meyendorff and Father Alexander Men' are banned, even burnt. 
 Finally, the Fundamentalism Project identified that religious fundamentalisms thrive in 
the climate of crisis and dislocation caused by "unsynchronised social, economic and cultural 
transformations and uneven schemes of development, by failures in education and social welfare 
systems, and ultimately by the collapse of long-held assumptions about the meaning and purpose 
of human existence."53While the Fundamentalism Project participants mostly focused on 
societies that had undergone a rapid and often brutal transition from 'traditional' to 'modern', 
Russia has experienced an equally dislocating experience in its transition from a global 
superpower to a 'second-world' state, in which obscene wealth and mass poverty are painfully 
visible. Hegumen Innokentii (Pavlov) observes that it is more appropriate to compare 'transition' 
Russia with the last years of the Shah's Iran than to compare it with Weimar Germany, as the 
former share an elite who flaunt lavish lifestyles and Western trappings of wealth, while the 
majority of the population live in poverty.54  
 Politically the role of the fundamentalists remains a marginal one. So far their limited 
electoral attempts have failed – although Evgenii Nikiforov, co-head of Radonezh and editor of 
their newspaper, has grown wiser since his failed attempt to be elected to the Duma in 
1995.55Hegumen Innokentii concludes that we do not need to fear a fundamentalist take-over like 
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53 Martin E.Marty and R.Scott Appleby "Conclusion: Remaking the State: The Limits of 
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55 Politicheskaia ksenophobia (Panorama, Moscow 1999) p.33. The Bishops Council of 1994 
also banned brotherhoods from practicing politics, although this ruling has failed to prevent them 
from commenting on political matters. (Ibid. p.106). 
that experienced by Iran, but his comparison is nevertheless an enlightening one.56Russians are 
faced with failing education and social welfare systems, reduced life expectancy and its multiple 
causes, glaring economic inequalities, and most importantly, the collapse of long-held 
assumptions about themselves and their nation. They are seeking not just economic security but a 
new national idea57that will meet their spiritual needs and rescue them from humiliation before 
the West. A "theology of rage, resentment and revenge,"58 such as that propagated by 
Simonovich and his fellow fundamentalists, could yet fill the vacuum felt by many. Their notable 
grass-roots presence is not just a comment on the state of the Church, but a comment on the state 
of the nation, and should not be ignored. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
56 It is worth noting that he remarks on the danger of interpreting Radonezh supporters as a 
significant socio-religious force, citing as evidence of this mistaken interpretation the 'noise' 
being created around the suggested canonisation of the Tsar's family. Four years later, Radonezh 
achieved their goal. 
 
57 See for example Inna Naletova, "Religion, the State and Civil Society" Perspective Vol.XII, 
No.3 (Jan-Feb 2002) at http://www.bu.edu/iscip. This search began in the last decades of the 
Soviet Union – see for example Dimitry Pospielovsky's 'The "Russian Orientation" and the 
Orthodox Church: From the Early Slavophiles to the "Neo-Slavophiles" in the USSR' in Religion 
and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics ed. Pedro Ramet (Duke University Press, 
Durham and London 1989) 
 
58 Karen Armstrong The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
(HarperCollins, London 2001) p.366. 
 
 
